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The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater
First Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual Propertyt
Mark P. McKenna*

I. THE REHNQUIST COURT'S IP/FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

In the last few years, many pages have been devoted to
retrospectives on Justice Rehnquist and the Rehnquist Court,' a fair
number of which focused on Justice Rehnquist's First Amendment
jurisprudence. 2 I focus here not on Justice Rehnquist specifically, but
on the Supreme Court as a whole during Rehnquist's tenure.
Specifically, I want to address the Court's view of the role of the First
Amendment in intellectual property cases. My thesis is a modest one:
while one certainly cannot describe the Rehnquist Court as eager to
find a conflict between intellectual property laws and the First
Amendment, there is reason to believe that it set the stage for greater
First Amendment scrutiny of intellectual property protections. At the
very least, the Court left that road open to future courts, which might
be inclined to view intellectual property more skeptically.
This conclusion is not, I admit, one that leaps from the pages of
the Supreme Court's decisions. In fact, if we look only at the
intellectual property cases the Rehnquist Court decided at least in part
on First Amendment grounds, we have very little to work with. By
my count, the Court decided only four intellectual property cases
even partially on First Amendment grounds during Rehnquist's
t
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1. See THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006); John 0. McGinnis,
Reviving Tocqueville 's America: The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudenceof Social Discovery, 90
CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002); Symposium, The Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (2004).
2. Some of that discussion has not been charitable. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, The
Hustler: Justice Rehnquist and "the Freedom of Speech, or of the Press," in THE REHNQUIST
LEGACY, supra note 1, at 11, 12 (arguing that "relative to his colleagues, Rehnquist was no
friend of the First Amendment").
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tenure on the Court, 3 five if you count product disparagement as an
intellectual property claim. 4 The Court decided only two of those

cases while Justice Rehnquist served as Chief Justice.
There is some irony in this lack of precedent. A good deal of
modem intellectual property scholarship focuses on the conflict
between intellectual property protection and First Amendment values
and related concepts such as "semiotic democracy.", 5 The Supreme
Court, however, appears not to have taken these commentators'
concerns terribly seriously. Moreover, the Court's inattention to First
Amendment concerns cannot be attributed to a lack of interest in
intellectual property generally; the Court decided forty-seven
intellectual property-related cases during Rehnquist's tenure on the
3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (considering the constitutionality of the
Copyright Term Extension Act); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987) (dealing with statutory protection of "Olympic" as a quasi-trademark); Harper &
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (addressing whether parody can
constitute fair use under the Copyright Act); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S.
562 (1977) (dealing with a right of publicity claim under Ohio law).
4. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). Product disparagement, or
"trade libel" as it is sometimes called, traditionally was regarded as a tort, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 623A-52, but commentators have suggested that Congress enacted
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act to cover trade libel and product disparagement when it passed
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935. See 2 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:9 (4th ed.

2005).
5. See Jack M. Balkin, DigitalSpeech and Democratic Culture:A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (arguing that
technological changes require "free speech values-interactivity, mass participation, and the
ability to modify and transform culture-[to] be protected through technological design and
through administrative and legislative regulation of technology, as well as through the more
traditional method of judicial creation and recognition of constitutional rights"); see also
Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that "copying is good" and noting the
Copying Serves It,
impact on First Amendment freedoms of narrowing fair use defense). The term "semiotic
democracy" comes from John Fiske, who used the term to describe popular participation in
cultural meaning making, which can be frustrated by intellectual property law. JOHN FISKE,
TELEVISION CULTURE 95, 236-39 (1987); see also William W. Fisher III, Property and
Contracton the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217 (1998) ("In an attractive society, all
persons would be able to participate in the process of meaning-making. Instead of being merely
passive consumers of cultural artifacts produced by others, they would be producers, helping to
shape the world of ideas and symbols in which they live."); Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 146
(1993) (defining semiotic democracy as "a society in which all persons are free and able to
participate actively, if not equally, in the generation and circulation of meanings and values").
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Court, and twenty-six during his tenure as Chief Justice. 6 To put this
6. The cases, in reverse chronological order, are: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005) (holding that one who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe a copyright is liable for the resulting acts of infringement
by third parties); KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111
(2004) (holding that a defendant asserting fair use under the Lanham Act need not prove
absence of any likelihood of confusion to sustain defense); Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (rejecting false designation of origin claim based on
copying of public domain work without attribution); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537
U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires a showing of actual
dilution); Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (upholding constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)
(considering the question of when prosecution history estoppel applies to bar claim of
infringement under doctrine of equivalents); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l,
Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (holding that newly developed plant breeds are patentable subject
matter); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that databases containing
individual articles taken from periodicals were not reproduced and distributed "as part of'
"revisions" of periodical issues and therefore could not be relicensed by owner of copyright in
collective work); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001)
(dealing with the constitutionality of a punitive damages award on a false advertising claim);
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (holding that existence of
expired utility patent covering product is strong evidence that the design is functional); WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (holding that a product design is
entitled to protection as unregistered trade dress only if it has acquired a secondary meaning);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
(holding that state sovereign immunity was neither validly abrogated by the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the State's activities in interstate commerce); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
(invalidating the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act's purported
abrogation of sovereign immunity); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) (holding that
commercial marketing of invention triggers on-sale bar under the Patent Act, even if invention
was not actually reduced to practice); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S.
340 (1998) (holding that Copyright Act does not grant right to have jury assess statutory
damages, but the Seventh Amendment provides the right to jury trial on all issues pertinent to
statutory damages); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135
(1998) (holding that the first sale doctrine under Copyright Act is applicable to imported
copies); Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (reaffirming
validity of doctrine of equivalents and outlining standards for application); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) (holding that color alone may serve as a trademark if
it has acquired secondary meaning); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(holding that 2 Live Crew's adaptation of Roy Orbison's Pretty Woman was a parody protected
by fair use doctrine); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (holding that prevailing
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants must be treated alike in awarding attorneys' fees under
Copyright Act); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that
inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable under the Lanham Act without showing that it
has acquired secondary meaning); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991) (holding that facts are not copyrightable and that alphabetical arrangement of white page
listings lacked the requisite originality for copyright protection); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic,
Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (holding that the use of a patented invention todevelop and submit

14
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information for marketing approval of medical devices under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act was not infringement); Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990) (considering
renewal rights of the statutory successors of a deceased author); Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (articulating standard for determining when a work
should be considered a "work for hire" under the Copyright Act); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (finding Florida statute prohibiting use of the direct
molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls or knowing sale of hulls preempted by
Supremacy Clause); S.F. Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522 (finding, among other things, that the
First Amendment did not prohibit Congress from granting exclusive use of the word "Olympic"
to the U.S. Olympic Committee); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (holding that magazine's
unauthorized publication of quotes from President Ford's unpublished memoirs was not a "fair
use" within meaning of Copyright Act); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S.
189 (1985) (holding that descriptiveness defense is unavailable to defendant when plaintiff's
trademark has become incontestable under Lanham Act); Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S.
153 (1985) (dealing with effect of termination on pre-termination grant of right to create
derivative work); Bose, 466 U.S. 485 (applying actual malice standard of New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to product disparagement claim, and subjecting lower court's
decision to standard of "convincing clarity"); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that manufacturers of multipurpose equipment cannot be secondarily
liable for users copyright infringements as long as the equipment is capable of substantial noninfringing uses); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982) (dealing with the
vicarious liability of a manufacturer under the Lanham Act where a third party mislabeled the
manufacturer's generic drug with the competitor's registered trademark) ; Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1981) (finding that while a mathematical formula by itself is not patentable, a
developed process containing the mathematical formula is patentable); Dawson Chem. Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980) (finding a patent holder's suit to prevent contributory
infringement by the party selling an herbicide with instructions for applying it by the patented
method did not amount to patent misuse); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
(finding living matter patentable as long as it is the product of human invention); Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (finding that the issuance of blanket
licenses by licensing agencies for composers, writers, and publishers did not constitute price
fixing that was per se unlawful under the antitrust laws); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257 (1979) (finding that federal patent law does not preempt state contract law);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (finding that when the only new feature of a process is a
mathematical formula, the new or improved process is not patentable subject matter); Zacchini,
433 U.S. 562 (dealing with a right of publicity claim under Ohio law); Dann v. Johnston, 425
U.S. 219 (1976) (holding that a "machine system for automatic record-keeping of bank checks
and deposits" was unpatentable on grounds of obviousness); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (finding that a restaurant owner who presented music to his
customers by the use of a radio and ceiling loudspeakers did not infringe on the copyright
holders' exclusive right to perform the copyrighted musical works publicly for profit); Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that Ohio's law of trade secrets was not
preempted by the patent laws of the United States); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974) (dealing with an infringement claim for the interception of
broadcast transmissions of copyrighted television programs); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973) (dealing with the constitutionality of a California statute criminalizing the offense of
'pirating' recordings produced by others); United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52
(1973) (holding that where patents were directly involved in antitrust violations, the
Government could challenge the patents' validity even though the owner did not rely on the
patents in defending the antitrust claim); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (finding that

2006]

First Amendment Scrutiny of IP

in perspective, the Court decided only thirteen intellectual property
cases during the twenty years before Rehnquist was confirmed. 7
Many of the intellectual property cases the Court decided while
Rehnquist served were quite significant. And while the Court during
that period cannot be characterized as hostile to intellectual property
protection, 8 it took positions in many of these cases that restricted the
scope of intellectual property laws. For example, the Court relied on
a certain computer program was a mathematical formula and thus was not patentable subject
matter). As with any such collection of cases, the number is subject to some subjective
assessment because some of these cases deal with intellectual property issues more squarely
than others. For example, I count Bose, 466 U.S. 485, as an intellectual property case because it
involved a product disparagement claim, which is a form of unfair competition claim. See supra
note 4. 1 recognize that others would not count this case, though it is interesting in that it
accepted without deciding that the New York Times v. Sullivan actual malice standard applied to
a claim of product disparagement based on a critical product review. Justice Rehnquist called it
"ironic" that the New York Times v. Sullivan test, which originated "because of the need for
freedom to criticize the conduct of public officials," was applied to a "magazine's false
statements about a commercial loudspeaker system." Id. at 515 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969)
(considering whether a patent was invalid for obviousness); Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653
(1969) (holding that a patent licensee is not estopped from challenging patent validity);
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (interpreting
performance right under Copyright Act); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714 (1967) (determining availability of attorneys' fees in trademark infringement
litigation under Lanham Act); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (interpreting
nonobviousness requirement of Patent Act); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964) (finding state law unfair competition claim preempted by Patent Act where state law
claim targets copying itself); Pub. Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 369 U.S. 111 (1962)
(addressing but declining to determine the copyrightability of speeches by public employee);
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) (finding replacement
of a spent unpatented element of a combination to constitute permissible repair and not
reconstruction); Miller Music Corp. v. Charles N. Daniels, Inc., 362 U.S. 373 (1960)
(interpreting statutory renewal rights of deceased composer); De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570 (1956) (determining interests in statutory renewal rights of author's widow and illegitimate
child); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (considering copyrightability of works of applied
art); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (determining whether a District Court
has jurisdiction to award relief to an American corporation for trademark infringements
consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and resident of the United States); F.W.
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952) (determining appropriate
damages for copyright infringement).
8. Some of the Rehnquist Court's intellectual property decisions were quite expansionist.
See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (upholding constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998); Qualitex, 514 U.S. 159 (holding that color alone may serve as a trademark
provided that it has acquired secondary meaning); Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 763 (holding that
inherently distinctive trade dress is protectable under the Lanham Act without showing that it
has acquired secondary meaning); Chakrabarty,447 U.S. 303 (holding that living matter may
be patentable as long as it is the result of human invention).
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copyright law's fair use doctrine to protect parodies 9 and on other
doctrinal constraints, such as the originality requirement, to limit the
scope of copyright protection. 10 The Court has similarly relied on
internal constraints of patent law to limit its scope, including twice
revisiting and recognizing the doctrine of prosecution history
estoppel, which limits the range of equivalents a patentee may claim
as infringing his or her patent. 11
Some of these "restrictionist" results can be explained simply as
12
the result of strict constructions of the governing statutes.
Frequently, however, the Court's positions have been motivated at
least in part by concerns about the effect of excessive protection on
the policies underlying other statutory regimes, or on competition
more generally. Several recent cases reflect a particular concern
about trademark law trenching on areas traditionally reserved to
patent and copyright law. 13 In TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing
Displays, Inc., for example, the Court adopted a somewhat broader
definition of functionality than appellate courts had been using,
concluding that a product feature need not be a competitive necessity
to be deemed functional. 14 Instead, a product feature should be
deemed functional, and therefore unable to serve as a trademark, if it
affects "the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or
quality of the article."15 Moreover, largely because of concerns about
the potential for trade dress protection to extend the patent period, the
Court held that expired utility patents give rise to a strong
presumption of functionality. 16
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Court
showed similar a concern about trademark law interfering with the
balance struck by copyright law.17 In Dastar, the Court refused to
9. See Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569.
10. See Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. 340 (holding that facts are not copyrightable and that
alphabetical arrangement of white page listings lacked the requisite originality for copyright
protection).
11. See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. 722; Warner-Jenkinson,520 U.S. 17.
12. See KP PermanentMake-Up, 543 U.S. 11l; Moseley, 537 U.S. 418.
13. See Dastar,539 U.S. 23; TrafFix,532 U.S. 23; Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. 205.
14. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33.
15. Id. at 32 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).
16. Id. at 34-35.
17. Dastar,539 U.S. at 32-35.
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allow a false designation of origin claim against a party that
reproduced material in the public domain and failed to attribute the
content to the copyright holder. 18 Though to reach its result the Court
employed a somewhat tortured definition of "origin," the key
statutory term, it clearly was concerned that allowing a false
designation of origin claim in this context would amount to backdoor
protection of content. Justice Scalia noted that allowing the claim
would "create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the
public's federal right to copy and to use expired copyrights."' 19
The Court has even expressed constitutional objections to the
application of intellectual property laws. In Florida Prepaid
PostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,2 °
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, invalidated the Patent
Act's purported abrogation of state sovereign immunity, leaving
states and their instrumentalities, including state universities with
large technology transfer offices, immune from infringement
lawsuits.2 '
So what can be said of the Rehnquist Court's treatment of
intellectual property? It has on several occasions seen good reason to
limit the scope of intellectual property protection to prevent its
encroachment on other values. But the Court has not been convinced
that intellectual property laws inappropriately burden free speech.In
Eldred v. Ashcroft,2 2 the Court's only decision squarely considering a
First Amendment objection to copyright law,2 3 the Court was quite
dismissive of any potential conflict between copyright and the First
Amendment. 24 In fact, the Eldred decision seems to have placed
copyright predominantly outside the First Amendment scheme, at
18. Id. at 37-38.
19. Id.at 34 (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 165
(1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
21. Id.
22. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
23. Specifically, Eldred involved a challenge to extension of the copyright term by the
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998.
24. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-22.
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least as long as Congress does not alter the "traditional contours of
copyright protection. 25
II. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ABOUT THE IP/FIRST AMENDMENT
INTERFACE

The Supreme Court's disinterest in intellectual property's impact
on free speech interests is consistent with courts' general
disinclination towards seeing First Amendment problems in
intellectual property cases. 2 a Indeed, the conventional wisdom holds
that copyright law, through its internal limiting mechanisms such as
the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use defense, adequately
27
protects First Amendment values. The Supreme Court clearly
embraced the notion that the fair use defense provides sufficient First
Amendment protection in Harper & Row, 2 8 and it emphasized
29
copyright's internal safeguards in reaching its decision in Eldred.
The appellate courts also seem to have been convinced that

25. Id. at 221 ("The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or decline
to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert the right to make other
people's speeches."). For a persuasive critique of the Court's reasoning, see Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and the First Amendment; What Eldred Misses-And Portends, in
COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 127, 136-39

(Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005).
26. See Netanel, supra note 25, at 128 ("Courts have almost never imposed First
Amendment limitations on copyright, and most have summarily rejected First Amendment
defences to copyright infringement claims."). Netanel suggests that this reluctance is relatively
unique to copyright law, and that courts have been more interested in First Amendment
implications of other forms of intellectual property. See id. at 129-30. As a relative matter,
Netanel is probably right, but courts only seem more concerned in those areas by comparison to
copyright, where they have exhibited virtually no concern. Courts' inattention to First
Amendment issues, as Eugene Volokh has said, is "unfortunate, because most intellectual
property rules-copyright law, trademark law, right of publicity law, and trade secret law-are
speech restrictions: They keep people from publishing, producing, and performing the speech
that they want to publish, produce, and perform." Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Intellectual Property:Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 Hous. L.
REV. 697, 698 (2003).
27. See Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The FirstAmendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims,
40 Hous. L. REV. 673, 676 (2003). Yen cites several cases that make claims about copyright's
internal protections of First Amendment values. See id. n. 11.
28. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
(accepting that copyright's idea/expression dichotomy "strike[s] a definitional balance between
the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author's expression") (internal citations omitted).
29. Eldred,537 U.S. at 218-22.
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copyright's internal safeguards are sufficient: as far as I have been
able to determine, no federal court of appeals has ever held that the
First Amendment provides a defense distinct from the traditional
"fair use" defense of copyright law.

Courts have been somewhat less willing to assert that there is no
separate First Amendment defense to trademark infringement. In fact,
some appellate courts have held that trademark law's likelihood of
confusion test does not sufficiently protect First Amendment

interests. 30 But those examples are the exception. In most of the cases
that have involved serious conflicts with free speech, courts have
found or created tools within trademark law to avoid explicit

engagement of the First Amendment. 31 Prior to the Supreme Court's
definitive pronouncement last term, 32 for example, many courts
insisted that fair use could not be found unless the defendant could

show that there was no likelihood of consumer confusion, essentially
33
subsuming fair use within the traditional infringement test.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in KP Permanent,
which repudiated that view, was rendered purely on statutory
grounds. Thus the fact remains that the Supreme Court has never
decided a trademark case on First Amendment grounds, even though
many trademark cases in lower courts during the Rehnquist years
raised serious First Amendment issues.3 4

30. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting approach
taken by other circuits that gave no special treatment to expressive works, and following, at
least superficially, the Rogers v. Grimaldi test); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989) (adopting a test that protects from liability a defendant who uses a trademark as the title
of an expressive work, unless the title has no artistic relevance or is explicitly misleading).
31. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A), (C) (2006) (providing defenses to federal
dilution cause of action for comparative advertising and news reporting); Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005) (recognizing nominative fair use
defense); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992)
(articulating nominative fair use defense in part to protect First Amendment interests).
32. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
33. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
McCarthy holds a similar view with respect to parody, concluding that "parody is no 'defense'
to a likelihood of confusion," but "merely a way of phrasing the traditional response that
customers are not likely to be confused as to source, sponsorship or approval." 5 J.T.
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 31:153 (4th ed.
1996).
34. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995); Roy Exp. Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672
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One of the few areas of intellectual property in which the Supreme
Court has recognized an explicit role for the First Amendment is the
right of publicity, which the Court addressed in 1977 in Zacchini v.
Scripps-HowardBroadcasting Co. 35 Not surprisingly, however, even
though it recognized that free speech interests were at issue, the Court
36
ultimately rejected the defendant's First Amendment defense. This
decision has been severely, and I think rightly, criticized both on
right of publicity and First Amendment grounds.37 Some appellate
courts recently have picked up on this criticism and have subjected
38
right of publicity claims to greater First Amendment scrutiny, but
the Supreme Court has never considered another right of publicity
case. 39

F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,459 U.S. 826 (1982); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates,
581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
35. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
36. Zacchini was a circus performer whose entire act (which was only a few seconds long
and consisted of being shot out of a cannon) was shown on a local news program. Zacchini
sued, claiming a violation of his right of publicity, despite what appeared to be classic
noncommercial use by the defendants. The Court concluded that the use was not
noncommercial, because it might negatively affect Zacchini's ability to generate money for his
performance. See id at 563-64, 575-76.
37. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U.
PITT. L. REv. 225, 251 n. 122 (2005) (noting that the Court conflated performance value and the
value of Zacchini's personality and that it inverted the traditional analysis of whether the use
was commercial by focusing on the impact of the use on the plaintiff's market rather than on the
nature of the defendant's use).
38. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 335 F.3d 1161 (10th
Cir. 2003) (concluding that Oklahoma would recognize a fair use defense to state law right of
publicity claim that would shield the defendant's parody baseball cards); ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding defendant's limited edition print featuring
Tiger Woods to be non-infringing fair use and thus entitled to First Amendment protection from
plaintiff's trademark and right of publicity claims).
39. Like in the trademark area, the Court's refusal to address First Amendment
implications of the right of publicity was not for lack of opportunity. See Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, McFarlane v. Twist, 540 U.S.
1106 (2004) (denying certiorari in case in which former hockey player asserted right of
publicity claim based on the use for a character in a comic book of a name similar to his).
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III. SOME DEVELOPMENTS THAT MAY AFFECT THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM

A. IncreasingNumbers of IP Events
This story of reluctance to find First Amendment problems in
intellectual property cases is not a heartening one for those who see
significant conflict in these types of cases. But there are reasons to
believe that courts might someday change their tune. As others have
observed, the Eldred opinion itself leaves the door open, ever so
slightly, for challenges to legislation that alters the "traditional
contours of copyright protection. ' , 40 And at least three other
developments may contribute to a change in the legal landscape.
First, increasing adoption and use of digital technologies has led
to a rise in the number of "IP events. 4 1 In some cases, these events
have raised new and different types of legal issues, or at least have
changed the nature of old issues so substantially as to require new
rules. For example, the VCR enabled users to time-shift an, in
addition to raising the question of whether such activity was
infringing, forced the Court to consider when the manufacturer of
such a multipurpose device, capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses, might be held secondarily liable for infringing uses
by its customers.4 2 Similarly, filesharing software significantly
complicated analysis of the Audio Home Recording Act's provision
allowing noncommercial copying.43

40. See Netanel, supra note 25, at 144-47 (using the Digital Millenium Copyright Act's
anti-circumvention provisions, which forbid access itself, as a possibly objectionable provision
even after Eldred); Yen, supra note 27, at 685-86 (noting that, after the Eldred decision, a
copyright regime with appropriate limits largely escapes scrutiny, but one without such limits is
subject to constitutional doubt).
41. 1 draw the term "IP events" from Michael Carroll, who has identified an explosion of
"copyright events" that digital technologies have let loose. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative
Commons and the New Intermediaries,2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1 (defining a "copyright event"
as "any action in the world that entails the exercise of one or more of a copyright owner's
exclusive rights to copy, distribute, perform, display or adapt information"). As Carroll
explains, not all copyright events are infringing, but all implicate copyright law.
42. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
43. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2001)
(discussing application of AHRA to Napster's filesharing software, and concluding that the file
exchange was not the type of "noncommercial use" protected from infringement and that the
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What distinguishes modem technology from prior technological
advancements that affected the copyright system, however, is that
digital technology has made possible and visible certain uses with
offline analogs that were traditionally considered outside the ambit of
intellectual property protection or, at least, were unlikely to be
noticed by intellectual property owners." As Lawrence Lessig
explained, the architecture of the offline world made enforcement of
intellectual property rights against a large number of private
individuals inefficient; as a result, individuals were practically free to
make a variety of technically infringing uses of copyrighted
material. 4 5 Digital technologies upset this equilibrium, making many
creative uses of copyrighted material not only easier to disseminate
but much more visible to copyright owners. As a result, intellectual
property owners now are able to pursue a variety of uses that before
would have gone unnoticed. Because many of those uses are private,
non-commercial uses, it seems very likely that many of these cases
will implicate speech interests more directly than the average cases
did in the analog era.
B. Fair Use and FirstAmendment Values Are Diverging
The second development is internal to copyright law. In those
cases in which the Court has been faced with First Amendment
issues, it frequently has fallen back on the fair use doctrine and
suggested, sometimes explicitly, that the fair use doctrine adequately
protects any relevant First Amendment interests. In Eldred, for
example, the Court determined that the fair use doctrine allows ample
room for criticism, comment and parody, and that independent First
Amendment review was therefore unnecessary. 46 But the extent to
which the fair use doctrine can be counted on to protect First
Amendment interests, perhaps always to some extent overstated, is
now in serious doubt.
Act does not cover downloading of MP3 files to computer hard drives); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 1008 (2006).
44. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 139-47 (2004).

45. Id.
46. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220-21 (2003).
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Two related trends in fair use law over the last twenty-some years
have worked together to loosen fair use from whatever First
Amendment core it once had. First, the "fair use as a market failure"
approach has degenerated fair use into a simple question of whether
the defendant's use might affect the market for the plaintiff's work. 47
In other words, the law has increasingly embraced the view that fair
use should be found only when the market cannot be counted on to
clear transactions between the affected parties, possibly because
transaction costs are too high.48 Second, the "effect on the market"
factor has been viewed increasingly broadly, focusing now not only
on the potential effect of the defendant's use on the market for the
plaintiffs work in its original form, but also on the potential effect on
hypothetical derivative markets49 the copyright owner has not even
shown an inclination to exploit.
When this view of fair use predominates and the cost of exploiting
derivative markets continues to fall because of advances in
technology, it will only be an accident if fair use happens to track
speech values. There is no good reason to believe that markets fail
only in circumstances in which speech is valuable (except, perhaps in
the parody context). If fair use has no normative premise other than
market efficiency, it is likely to diverge from First Amendment
values, making the Court's reliance on fair use as a bulwark for
speech values increasingly questionable.
One very recent development illustrates this divergence well. The
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC), a collective agency that acts as
an intermediary between content owners and users, recently
announced its development of a product that will allow faculty and
47. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of American Copyright Fair Use Cases
(Working Paper), abstract available at http://bartonbeebe.com/workingpapers.htm
("Preliminary analysis confirms the widely-held belief that factor four ("the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work") is uniquely dispositive" of the
fair use analysis) (draft on file with author).
48. Though she resists the association, the concept of fair use as a function of market
failure originated with Wendy Gordon. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.

REv. 1600 (1982). For recent work showing her reluctance to embrace this mantle, see Wendy
J. Gordon, The "Market Failure" and Intellectual Property: A Response to ProfessorLunney,

82 B.U. L. REv. 1031 (2002).
49. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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staff using Blackboard automatically to seek permission for their use
of copyrighted material. 50 The problem with this system is that many
of the uses faculty and staff might make of copyrighted material
would traditionally be regarded as classic examples of fair use.
Teaching, scholarship, and research, for example, three of the uses of
copyrighted materials faculty are most likely to make, are explicitly
listed as examples of potential fair uses in the preamble of section
107 of the Copyright Act.i CCC's program ignores the possibility of
fair use and erects a market structure that presumes a requirement of
licensing. Yet, in so doing, CCC may make it so; by creating a
market for licensing of this material, CCC has a legitimate argument
that this use should no longer qualify as fair use when done without
permission.12 In such a case, the fair use doctrine might not
adequately protect academics' First Amendment interests.
C. Restrictions on Commercial Speech Get GreaterScrutiny
The final development is the increasing respect the Court has
shown commercial speech, formerly the poor stepchild of First
Amendment law. The Court first held that commercial advertising
was constitutionally protected in its 1976 ruling in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.53 Though
50. See Copyright.com, Blackboard, http://www.copyright.com/ccc/do/viewPage?page
Code=i14 (last visited May 16, 2006).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.
Id.
52. Cf Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
corporation's unauthorized copying of scientific articles for its researchers was not fair use).
This case arose in a corporate setting, of course, and is therefore distinguishable from potential
academic uses. Nevertheless, the case turned significantly on the fact that there was a market
for copies of individual articles, which CCC provided. For a general description of the problem
of feedback of licensing practices into copyright law, see James Gibson, Risk Aversion and
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law 3-21 (July 26, 2006) (unpublished manuscript,
draft on file with author and available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-918871).
53. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited
pharmacists from advertising drug prices).
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the Court "seemingly pulled back on that protection in the 1980s[, it]
has been providing more and more protection [to commercial speech]
since the early 1990s."' 54 Particularly notable was the Court's decision
in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. Rhode Island," which overturned Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 56 a case
that allowed legislatures to choose to regulate truthful, nonmisleading speech. In 44 Liquormart, Justice Stevens stated that a
"state legislature does not have the broad discretion to suppress
truthful, nonmisleading information for paternalistic purposes that the
Posadasmajority was willing to tolerate. 57
Even more striking given commercial speech's long pedigree as
outcast, a plurality in 44 Liquormartwas willing to jettison, at least in
part, the controlling Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission test for evaluating restrictions on commercial
speech.5 8 Justice Thomas suggested that, at least in some
circumstances, any distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech should be abolished, 59 and Justice Scalia
indicated that he might be persuaded to make such a ruling in the
future. 60 Given the recent changes on the Court, it is entirely possible
54. Volokh, supra note 26, at 732. Cases in the 19 9 0 s contributing to this expansion
include Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001); GreaterNew Orleans Broad.Ass'n v. UnitedStates, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476 (1995); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993); and City of Cincinnatii'. Discovery
Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
55. 517 U.S. 484.
56. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
57. 44Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 510.
58. In Central Hudson, the Court adopted a four-part analysis of commercial speech
restrictions. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we
must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For
commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
59. 44Liquormart,517 U.S. at518-28.
60. Id.at 517-18.
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that the Court will subject at least some commercial speech
regulations to greater First Amendment scrutiny.
A higher level of review, if it comes about, will likely have much
more significant consequences for trademark protection than for
copyright. Copyright has its own constitutional authority, and the
Court in Eldredmade clear that the IP clause confers immunity from
First Amendment analysis, at least when copyright law takes its
"traditional" form. Trademark protection, by contrast, is based on
Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce and should be given
no more weight than any other restrictions on commercial speech.
Yet, trademark law often has not taken the First Amendment
seriously because, courts have suggested, it restricts only deceptive
commercial speech that lacks serious First Amendment value. 6' And
the Supreme Court has indeed indicated that deceptive commercial
speech may be treated differently for First Amendment purposes. 62
But even if characterizing trademark law in such a manner exempts
traditional trademark protection,6 3 it is not likely to answer
61. See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that "trademark law permissibly regulates misleading commercial
speech"); see also World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Big Dog Holdings, Inc., 280 F. Supp.
2d 413, 430 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (same).
62. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984).
Though false and misleading commercial speech could be deemed to represent a
category of unprotected speech, the rationale for doing so would be essentially the
same as that involved in the libel area, viz, there is no constitutional value in false
statements of fact. Moreover, since a commercial advertiser usually seeks to
disseminate information about a specific product or service he himself provides and
presumably knows more about than anyone else, there is a minimal danger that
governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill
accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
63. Eugene Volokh suggests that there is a potential distinction to be drawn between
dilution laws and the types of advertising bans that the Court has struck down in its modem
commercial speech cases. He suggests that those advertising laws restrict communication of
factual information (i.e., the price of pharmaceuticals), while dilution laws restrict the use of
trademarks as "part of the nonfactual (image-building, attention-grabbing, or simply amusing)
component of the promotion." Volokh, supra note 26, at 733. Though he makes clear that, as
applied to noncommercial speech, such a distinction would not get dilution laws off the hook,
the prospect of trademark proponents advancing such an argument is deeply ironic. For many
years, commentators have argued that expansive trademark protection encourages and rewards
inefficient advertising expenditures. Advertising, they argue, very often lacks serious
informational value, and instead serves only a persuasive function that provides little or no
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satisfactorily any objections to more recent doctrinal developments.
Trademark law now targets a good deal of speech that is not
deceptive. Consequently, at least some of modem trademark law
would have to be judged like any other commercial speech
regulation. And in Central Hudson, the Court stated that although the
special nature of commercial speech may require less than strict
review of its regulation, special concerns arise from "regulations that
entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a nonspeechrelated policy." 64 Protection against dilution, for example, would
seem to fall squarely within that area of concern-it prohibits the
non-misleading use of particular words to pursue a clearly
nonspeech-related commercial policy.65
Additionally, trademark owners now frequently assert their rights
against uses that, at the very least, blur the line between commercial
and non-commercial uses.6 6 Unlike uses of a mark in connection with
specific products or services, these uses comment on or transform the
mark for some expressive purpose. Such uses are difficult to
categorize as commercial or non-commercial, but to the extent they
consumer benefit. See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948); Glynn S.Lunney, Jr., Trademark
Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999). Supporters of trademark protection have consistently
rejected such arguments, claiming that advertising promotes social welfare because it
predominantly provides information to consumers and may signal quality. See, e.g., WILLIAM
LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

173-74 (2003); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of Product
Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986) (arguing that advertising investment alone can signal
product quality even when the informational content of the ads is nothing). Thus, it would be
quite ironic for supporters of trademark protection to resist First Amendment defenses by
claiming that dilution protection does not restrict communication of information, but only of
nonfactual content.
64. Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 556 n.9 (1980).
65. The same difficulties apply, probably to an even greater extent, to the right of
publicity and of trade secret protection, which traditionally have not required evidence of
confusion or deception. The right of publicity targets unauthorized commercial uses of an
individual's identity, without regard to whether such uses cause any confusion. Likewise,
several recent cases that impose restraints on third-party disclosure of trade secrets raise serious
concerns that Eldred seems to leave open. See, e.g., Bruce Japsen, Paper Barredfrom Using
Data, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2006 (discussing injunction entered by California Superior Court
barring a local newspaper from publishing information about a company's clinical trials
involving an experimental blood substitute, which the paper had acquired pursuant to the
California Public Records Act).
66. See, for example, cases cited supra note 32.
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are non-commercial and not deceptive, the conflict seems even
greater.
Few courts have attempted to categorize these types of uses.
Those that have generally have turned to the Supreme Court's factors
in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., considering: (1) whether
the communication is an advertisement; (2) whether it refers to a
specific product or service; and (3) whether the speaker has an
economic motivation for the speech.67 Under this test, a variety of
uses that have been condemned by courts might be protected. Take,
for example, the parody advertisement that the defendants in
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications ran on the back of
their humor magazine.6 8 There, the "Michelob Oily" ad was not a real
advertisement, and referred to the Michelob product only for its
parodic effect. The speaker surely was economically motivated, in
much the same way that newspaper publishers and the producers of
Saturday Night Live are commercially motivated. Yet, the ad also is
clearly distinguishable from the situation that was trademark law's
traditional concern: uses by a competitor of a mark similar to the
plaintiffs for the purpose of identifying the source of the defendant's
own products or services.
If the Supreme Court does begin to require greater scrutiny of
trademark protection, courts will be forced to analyze cases like
Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci in much different ways than they
traditionally have. In addition to having to categorize the speech at
issue, for example, courts will be constrained by Cohen v. California,
which reasoned that restricting the ability to use particular words runs
"a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process. 69 Perhaps the
commercial speech cases can be distinguished in some instances or
First Amendment concerns can be overcome in other ways, 70 but
subjecting trademark protection to greater scrutiny will at least
require courts to engage the issue specifically.
67. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983).
68. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1112 (1995).
69. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
70. See Volokh, supra note 26, at 733.
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IV. CONCLUSION
As I said near the beginning of this Article, my thesis is a modest
one. I cannot predict that the Roberts Court will begin an IPiFirst
Amendment revolution. But while the Rehnquist Court was not
particularly concerned about the impact of intellectual protections on
free speech, it left the door open to greater scrutiny. Given some of
the recent developments within and without intellectual property law,
courts that are more concerned about a conflict may reconsider their
traditional reluctance to address the issue.

